Finite Memory Distributed Systems
AbstractA distributed system model is studied, where individual agents engage in repeated play against each other and can change their strategies based upon previous play. Similar to Dorofeenko and Shorish (2005), it is shown how to model this environment in terms of continuous population densities (probabilities) of agent types. A complication arises because the population densities of different strategies depend upon each other not only through game payoffs, but also through the strategy distributions themselves. In spite of this, it is shown that when an agent imitates the strategy of his previous opponent and the rate of this imitation is high enough, the system of master equations which govern the dynamical evolution of agent populations can be reduced with high precision to one equation for the total population. In a sense, the dynamics of the full system can 'collapse' to the dynamics of the entire system taken as a whole, which describes the behavior of all types of agents. We explore the implications of this model, and present both analytical and simulation results
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 with number 333.
Date of creation: 04 Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Fokker-Plank; distributed system; fixed strategy;
Other versions of this item:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.