Evolving Strategic Behaviors through Competitive Interaction in the Large
AbstractHere we provide a new approach for investigating competitive interactions in the large. We also study emergent strategic behaviors and analyze the effects of bounded rationality and the mimicry strategy in competitive situations. We show how society gropes its way towards equilibrium in an imperfect world where agents are sensible but not perfectly rational. Agents have limited information and no common knowledge. This paper is also about social learning and shows how society as a whole learns even when the individuals composing it do not. Specifically, it is about the evolution of social norms. We especially examine how conventions evolve in a society that begins in an amorphous state, where there is no established custom, and individuals rely on hearsay to determine what to do. With simulations, we provide specific conditions on which conventions are most likely to emerge.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 with number 1211.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 1999
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-07-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-1999-08-22 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-EVO-1999-07-12 (Evolutionary Economics)
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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