Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions
AbstractAs Posner (1997) has observed, when individuals in a relationship can commit to imposing costs upon each other then efficient behavior in the absence of law is possible. The question is whether efficient norms of behavior evolve endogenously in a population. We show that in a standard hold up model in which both parties make relationship specific investments that the long run outcome of a stochastic adaptation process similar to Young's (1993) 'adaptive play' does in general not correspond to the efficient equilibria. As Grossman and Hart (1986) observe, institutions, such as firms, may be needed to improve the allocation of resources.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 with number 104.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2001
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Hold-Up Problem; Bargaining; Evolution;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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