Central banks frequently intervene in foreign exchange markets to reduce volatility or to correct misalignments. Such operations may be successful if they drive away destabilizing speculators. However, the speculators do not simply vanish but may reappear on other foreign exchange markets. Using a model in which traders are able to switch between foreign exchange markets, we demonstrate that while a central bank indeed has several means at hand to stabilize a specific market, the variability of the other markets depends on how the interventions are implemented.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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