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The persistence of inferior cultural-institutional conventions

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  • Marianna Belloc
  • Samuel Bowles

Abstract

Our theory of cultural-institutional persistence and innovation is based on uncoordinatedupdating of individual social norms and contracts, so that both culture and institutions are endogenous. We explain why Pareto-dominated cultural-institutional configurations may persistover long periods and how transitions may nonetheless occur. Unlike models in which elites may impose inferior institutions or cultures as a self-interested distributional strategies, in our model, the exercise of elite power plays no role in either persistence or innovation, and transitions occur endogenously. We show that persistence will be the greater the more inferior is the Pareto-dominated configuration and the more rational and individualistic is the population.

Suggested Citation

  • Marianna Belloc & Samuel Bowles, 2012. "The persistence of inferior cultural-institutional conventions," Working Papers in Public Economics 157, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    • Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp157
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    endogenous institutions; endogenous social norms; cultural-institutional persistence; evolutionary game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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