The law of survival of the political class: an analysis of the Italian Parliament (1946-2010)
AbstractDrawing on Alchianâ€Ÿs and Schumpeterâ€Ÿs theories about the market selection of entrepreneurs and on theories of the political class, we focus on the features characterizing the Italian post-war democratic Parliament, from 1946 to 2010. We analyse the survival of the members of the Italian Parliament, taking into account all available information concerning their individual characteristics and political affiliation. We apply the stratified Cox model, taking into consideration the order of re-election of the 15,357 repeated observations (representing 7,127 members of the Italian Parliament since 1946), who are followed as if they were â€œpatientsâ€ in order to study their parliamentary survival.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number 146.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Political enterprise; political class; survival analysis; Italian Parliament.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2012-02-27 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-POL-2012-02-27 (Positive Political Economics)
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