In the framework of a Diamond-Dybvig-Peck-Shell banking model, in which a broad class of feasible contractual arrangements is allowed and which admits a run equilibrium, we stress the assumption that depositors are uncertain of their position in the queue when expecting a run. The formalization of the depositor's attitude towards this form of uncertainty is inspired by the multiple prior maxmin expected utility (MEU) theory axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). We prove that there exists a positive measure set of subjective prior beliefs, obtained from the minimization over the set of admissible priors, for which the bank run equilibrium disappears. The implication is that `suspension schemes' are valuable since, in addition to the improvement in risk-sharing among agents (Wallace (1990)), they may undermine panic-driven bank runs.
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Paper provided by Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number
71.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003.
"Equilibrium Bank Runs,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Peck, James & Shell, Karl, 2001.
"Equilibrium Bank Runs,"
Working Papers
01-10r, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
[Downloadable!]