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Sovereign debt capacity and the distribution of domestic wealth: a common agency problem

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Author Info
Debora Di Gioacchino
Sergio Ginebri
Laura Sabani

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Abstract

This paper proposes a stylized two-period two-country model illustrating the role played by the distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country’s level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy as the outcome of the interaction between the domestic government and interest groups (locals and foreigners) with conflicting preferences about debt repayment (common agency framework). The main result produced by our model is that, although discriminatory taxation against foreign bond-holders is not available and foreigners are allowed entering the process of buying influence, default is always ex-post observed when all domestic interests are represented and a share of sovereign debt is detained by foreigners. On the contrary, by assuming selective participation to lobbying, we show that a borrowing country’s access to international capital markets increases with inequality in the domestic distribution of wealth.

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File URL: http://dep.eco.uniroma1.it/docs/working_papers/Wp105.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: 2007
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number 105.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:105

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Related research
Keywords: Public debt; Government default; Political economy; Political support; Special interests; Common agency.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.


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