Gradualism and Irreversibility
AbstractThis paper considers a class of two-player dynamic games in which each player controls a one-dimensional variable which we interpret as a level of cooperation. In the base model, there is an irreversibility constraint stating that this variable can never be reduced, only increased. It otherwise satisfies the usual discounted repeated game assumptions. Under certain restrictions on the payoff function, which make the stage game resemble a continuous version of the Prisoners' Dilemma, we characterize efficient symmetric quilibria. Efficient cooperation levels exhibit gradualism and converge, when payoffs are smooth, to a level strictly below the one-shot efficient level: the irreversibility induces a steady-state as well as a dynamic inefficiency. As players become very patient, however, payoffs converge to (though never attain) the efficient level. We also show that a related model in which an irreversibility arises through players choosing an incremental variable, such as investment, can be transformed into the base model with similar results. An application to a public goods sequential contribution model is discussed. The analysis is extended to incorporate sequential moves, asymmetric equilibria and partial reversibility.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews in its series Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics with number 199909.
Date of creation: 15 Dec 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL
Phone: 01334 462420
Fax: 01334 462444
Web page: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Lockwood, Ben & Thomas, Jonathan P, 2002. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 339-56, April.
- Ben Lockwood & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2002. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 339-356.
- Ben Lockwood & Jonathan P. Thomas, 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," CSGR Working papers series 28/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
- Lockwood, B. & Thomas, J.P., 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 525, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Lockwood, B. & Thomas, J.P., 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 550, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 259-76, April.
- Fershtman, C. & Nitzan, S., 1988.
"Dynamic Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods,"
21-88, Tel Aviv.
- Ghemawat, Pankaj & Nalebuff, Barry, 1990. "The Devolution of Declining Industries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 167-86, February.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bram Boskamp).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.