Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problems
AbstractI develop a model of endogenous bounded rationality due to search costs, arising implicitly from the problem's complexity. The decision maker is not required to know the entire structure of the problem when making choices but can think ahead, through costly search, to reveal more of it. However, the costs of search are not assumed exogenously; they are inferred from revealed preferences through her choices. Thus, bounded rationality and its extent emerge endogenously: as problems become simpler or as the benefits of deeper search become larger relative to its costs, the choices more closely resemble those of a rational agent. For a fixed decision problem, the costs of search will vary across agents. For a given decision maker, they will vary across problems. The model explains, therefore, why the disparity, between observed choices and those prescribed under rationality, varies across agents and problems. It also suggests, under reasonable assumptions, an identifying prediction: a relation between the benefits of deeper search and the depth of the search. As long as calibration of the search costs is possible, this can be tested on any agent-problem pair. My approach provides a common framework for depicting the underlying limitations that force departures from rationality in different and unrelated decision-making situations. Specifically, I show that it is consistent with violations of timing independence in temporal framing problems, dynamic inconsistency and diversification bias in sequential versus simultaneous choice problems, and with plausible but contrasting risk attitudes across small- and large-stakes gambles.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews in its series Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics with number 201314.
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Other versions of this item:
- Theodoros M. Diasakos, 2008. "Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problems," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 90, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-10-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-18 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2013-10-18 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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