Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies
AbstractThis paper studies insurance arrangements in village economies when there is complete information but limited commitment. Commitment is limited because only limited penalties can be imposed on households which renege on their promises. Any efficient insurance arrangements must therefore take into account that households will renege if the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. We study a general model which admits aggregate and idiosyncratic risk as well as serial correlation of incomes. It is shown that in the case of two households and no storage the efficient insurance arrangement is characterized by a simple updating rule. An example illustrates the similarity of the efficient arrangement to a simple debt contract with occasional debt forgiveness. The model is then extended to multiple households in southern India to test the theory against three alternative models: autarky, full insurance, and a static model of limited commitment due to Coate and Ravaillon (1993). Overall, the model we develop does a significantly better job of explaining the data than does any of these alternatives.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm in its series CRIEFF Discussion Papers with number 9705.
Date of creation: Oct 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL
Phone: 01334 462420
Fax: 01334 462438
Web page: http://crieff.wordpress.com/
More information through EDIRC
Village economy; efficient insurance; limited commitment;
Other versions of this item:
- Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1997. "Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 97/08, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Oct 2000.
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2002.
"International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 907-928, May.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2000. "International business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets," Staff Report 265, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2000. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 7870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sutherland, Alan, 2002.
"International monetary policy coordination and financial market integration,"
Working Paper Series
0174, European Central Bank.
- Alan Sutherland, 2002. "International monetary policy coordination and financial market integration," International Finance Discussion Papers 751, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Sutherland, Alan, 2004. "International Monetary Policy Coordination and Financial Market Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 4251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Holzmann, Robert & Jorgensen, Steen, 1999.
"Social protection as social risk management : conceptual underpinnings for the social protection sector strategy paper,"
Social Protection Discussion Papers
20119, The World Bank.
- Paul Mosley & Robert Holzmann & Steen Jorgensen, 1999. "Social protection as social risk management: conceptual underpinnings for the social protection sector strategy paper," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(7), pages 1005-1027.
- Broer, Tobias, 2011. "The wrong shape of insurance? What cross-sectional distributions tell us about models of consumption-smoothing," CEPR Discussion Papers 8701, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- DiTella, Rafael & MacCulloch, Robert, 1999.
"Informal family insurance and the design of the welfare state,"
ZEI Working Papers
B 23-1999, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2002. "Informal Family Insurance And The Design Of The Welfare State," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 481-503, July.
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 1998. "Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State," JCPR Working Papers 44, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
- Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, .
"Quantitative Asset Pricing Implications of Endogenous Solvency Constraints,"
Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers
10-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Alvarez, Fernando & Jermann, Urban J, 2001. "Quantitative Asset Pricing Implications of Endogenous Solvency Constraints," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 1117-51.
- Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 1999. "Quantitative Asset Pricing Implications of Endogenous Solvency Constraints," NBER Working Papers 6953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 1999. "Quantitative asset pricing implications of endogenous solvency constraints," Working Papers 99-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Attanasio, Orazio & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 2000. "Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public insurance reduce welfare?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1225-1258, June.
- Paul Huck & Sherrie L. W. Rhine & Philip Bond & Robert Townsend, 1999. "Small business finance in two Chicago minority neighborhoods," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 46-62.
- Robert Holzmann & Steen Jørgensen, 2001.
"Social Risk Management: A New Conceptual Framework for Social Protection, and Beyond,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 529-556, August.
- Robert Holzmann & Steen Jorgensen, 2000. "Social risk management : a new conceptual framework for social protection and beyond," Social Protection Discussion Papers 21314, The World Bank.
- Ana María Ibañez & Andrés Moya, 2010.
"Do Conflicts Create Poverty Traps? Asset Losses and Recovery for Displaced Households in Colombia,"
in: The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America, pages 137-172
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ana María Ibáñez & Andrés Moya, 2009. "Do conflicts create poverty traps? Asset losses and recovery for displaced households in Colombia," Research Working Papers 10, MICROCON - A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bram Boskamp).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.