A Constitution for Privatized Eastern Enterprise
AbstractWestern advisors of Eastern reform favour outside, stock-market ownership and control of large privatized enterprise. However, Japanese firms and their Western transplants are dominated by employee stakeholders as implicit residual owners. Their success, and political contraints, suggest a majority equity stake for (often-entrenched) Eastern empoloyees, closely linked to bank creditors with majority board membership and remaining equity. Residual-claimant status removes the incentive for redistributive wage claims (that have decimated East German employment) and maximises motivation for cooperative effort, supported by relational banking for efficient intervention, investment, control and restructuring in case of default.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm in its series CRIEFF Discussion Papers with number 9302.
Date of creation: Oct 1993
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Privatization; Corporate Governance; Japanese firm; State-owned Enterprise; Eastern Europe;
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- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems
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