The Hidden Surplus From Research Joint Ventures: An Application Of Systems Reliability Theory
AbstractThe paper’s aim is two fold: (a) to model some key features of the research process as a multi-component system, as understood by the mathematical theory of systems reliability; and (b) to apply the resulting model to Research Joint Ventures, showing that a potentially very large surplus can be realized purely by organizing research efficiently, i.e. even without any changes in R&D investment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm in its series CRIEFF Discussion Papers with number 0610.
Date of creation: Nov 2006
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More information through EDIRC
optimal organization; systems reliability; Research Joint Ventures; parallel and series systems; majorization; organizational surplus.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-11-12 (Business Economics)
- NEP-INO-2006-11-12 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2006-11-12 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-KNM-2006-11-12 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
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