On the Possibility of Pareto-improving Pension Reform
AbstractThe aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it provides a simple framework for the analyses of the transitions between two steady states with different fiscal policies. This allows us to clarify the existing results on the possibility of Pareto-improving transitions from pay-as-you-go to fully funded pension systems. We show that the reduction in the marginal tax rate is a sufficient condition for the possibility of such pension reforms. Second, the paper investigates the features and the duration of the shortest Pareto-improving pension reform in an open economy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm in its series CRIEFF Discussion Papers with number 0504.
Date of creation: Feb 2005
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Pension reform; Pareto-improving transition; the shortest transition.;
Other versions of this item:
- Tatiana Damjanovic, 2006. "On The Possibility Of Pareto-Improving Pension Reform," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 74(6), pages 711-724, December.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
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