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Deficits, Coalition Effects and the Timing of Decisions

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  • Gerald Pech

Abstract

This paper develops an intertemporal model of legislative bargaining in the presence of distorting redistributive instruments. It includes negotiations in the cabinet and in the parliament that acts with or without coalitional discipline. We focus on the comparison of outcomes with negotiations on a debt target prior to tax spending decisions to outcomes where the level of debt is renegotiated. In the cabinet, a switch to targeting procedures allows for local improvements in debt policies. In the parliament with lack of coalitional discipline targeting results in a materially balanced budget.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm in its series CRIEFF Discussion Papers with number 0023.

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Date of creation: Feb 2000
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Handle: RePEc:san:crieff:0023

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Related research

Keywords: Public debt; Budgeting; Non cooperative bargaining;

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References

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  1. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July.
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
  3. Gerald Pech, 2004. "Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-24, October.
  4. Mark Hallerberg & Jurgen von Hagen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Working Papers 6341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Persson, Torsten & Roland , Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Seminar Papers 633, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  6. Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 6589, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1988. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the IndustrialDemocracies," NBER Working Papers 2682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. repec:fth:coluec:754 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March.
  10. repec:fth:eeccco:96 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Gerald Pech, 2004. "Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-24, October.

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