We investigate how imperfect competition affects the occurence and properties of endogenous business cycles with underemployment in an overlapping generations model. We consider a competitive product market in association with an imperfect labour market. The latter is presented in two variants. These differ from each other by the game-theoretical concepts used in the description of market equilibria, namely the cooperative concept of Nash-Bargaining and the noncooperative concept of Nash-Cournot. Although they are different, both cases admit the union-monopoly as a limit case. We show that the existence of cycles depends on the degree of market power. Our results are illustrated for specific preferences and technology.
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Paper provided by Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm in its series CRIEFF Discussion Papers with number
0011.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
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