Interest Rate Bounds and Fiscal Policy
AbstractWhen the monetary authority controls the short-term interest rate we find that under a regime of permanent (and even persistent but temporary) deficits that a strict upper bound on the feasible interest rate sequence is present. More generally, the satisfaction of the fiscal authority’s present value budget constraint in the presence of a deficit sequence, means that monetary and fiscal decisions cannot be independent. This is an important caveat to the results in McCallum (1984).
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Date of creation: 15 Oct 2004
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Intertemporal macro; monetary policy and fiscal policy interactions.;
Other versions of this item:
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
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