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Capital Subsidies and Underground Production

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Author Info
Franco, Busato (CELPE (Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy), University of Salerno, Italy)
Bruno, Chiarini () (CELPE (Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy), University of Salerno, Italy)
Pasquale, de Angelis () (CELPE (Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy), University of Salerno, Italy)
Elisabetta, Marzano () (CELPE (Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy), University of Salerno, Italy)

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate the effects of different fiscal policies on the firm choice to produce underground. We consider a tax evading firm operating simultaneously both in the regular and in the underground economy. We suggest that such a kind of firm, referred to as moonlighting firm, is able to offset the specific costs usually stressed by literature on underground production, such as those suggested by Loayza (1994) and Anderberg et alii (2003). Investigating the effects of different fiscal policy interventions, we find that taxation is a critical parameter to define the size of capital allocation in the underground production. In fact, a strong and inverse relationship is found, and tax reduction is the best policy to reduce the convenience to produce underground. We also confirm the depressing effect on investment of taxation (see, for instance, Summers, 1981), so that tax reduction has no cost in terms of investment. By contrast, the model states that while enforcement is an effective tool to reduce capital allocation in the underground production, it also reduce the total capital stock. Moreover, we also suggest that the allowance of incentives to capital accumulation may generate, in this specific typology of firm, some unexpected effects, causing, together with a positive investment process, also an increase in the share of irregularity. This finding could explain, in a microeconomic framework, the evidence of Italian southern regions, where high incentives are combined with high irregularity ratios.

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File URL: http://www.unisa.it//download/75_359_1262176486_96_dp.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CELPE (Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy), University of Salerno, Italy in its series CELPE Discussion Papers with number 96.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 30 Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sal:celpdp:0096

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Related research
Keywords: tax evasion; moonlighting; capital subsidies; underground production;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity
E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Maria Rosaria Carillo & Maurizio Pugno, 2002. "The underground economy and the underdevelopment trap," Department of Economics Working Papers 0201, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bruno Chiarini & Elisabetta Marzano, 2004. "Dimensione E Dinamica Dell'Economia Sommersa: Un Approfondimento Del Currency Demand Approach," Working Papers 4_2004, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Lawrence H. Summers, 1981. "Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory Approach," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 12(1981-1), pages 67-140. [Downloadable!]
  4. Trandel, Greg & Snow, Arthur, 1999. "Progressive income taxation and the underground economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 217-222, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alm, James, 1985. "The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(2), pages 243-63, April.
  6. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro, 2002. "Shadow Activity and Unemployment in a Depressed Labour Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 3433, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Francesco Busato & Bruno Chiarini, 2004. "Market and underground activities in a two-sector dynamic equilibrium model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 831-861, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dan Anderberg & Alessandro Balestrino & Umberto Galmarini, 2003. "Search and Taxation in a Model of Underground Economic Activities," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 647-659, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Elisabetta Marzano, 2004. "Dual Labour Market Theories And Irregular Jobs: Is There a Dualism Even in The Irregular Sector?," CELPE Discussion Papers 81, CELPE (Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  11. Loayza, Norman V., 1996. "The economics of the informal sector: a simple model and some empirical evidence from Latin America," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 129-162, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Loayza, Norman V., 1994. "Labor regulations and the informal economy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1335, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Floro Ernesto Caroleo – Gianluigi Coppola, 2005. "The Impact of the Institutions on Regional Unemployment Disparities," CELPE Discussion Papers 98, CELPE (Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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