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Banks with Peso-Dominated Deposits in Small Open Economies with Aggregate Liquidity Shocks

Author

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  • Enrique L. Kawamura

    (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres)

Abstract

I extend the traditional Diamond Dybvig framework with aggregate liquidity shocks to small open economies. Currency board may imply perfect risk sharing (with perfect credit markets), contrary to Chang and Velasco’s …ndings (2000). With interim-date borrowing constraints and …xed exchange rates, Wallace’ s (1990) partial suspension of convertibility of deposits is obtained. A banking system with an international lender may implement both allocations without runs. Flexible exchange rates with local-currency denominated deposits improves risk sharing relative to …xed exchange rates when borrowing constraints are present. It also avoids equilibrium bank runs.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrique L. Kawamura, 2000. "Banks with Peso-Dominated Deposits in Small Open Economies with Aggregate Liquidity Shocks," Working Papers 27, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jun 2002.
    • Handle: RePEc:sad:wpaper:27
    as

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    File URL: https://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc27.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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