Ostracism and Common Pool Resource Management in a Developing Country: Young Fishers in the Laboratory
AbstractThis paper investigates how the possibility to ostracise, which is a familiar punishment mechanism to subjects in an experiment, affects harvest in a common pool resource experiment. The experiment was framed as a fishing problem and the subjects were young fishers in Ghana. We find that the introduction of the possibility to ostracise other members of a group at a cost to the remaining members of a group decreased over-fishing significantly in comparison with the situation where ostracism was not possible. The ostracism was based on at least 50 percent voting rule. Moreover, the subjects demonstrated a strong desire to ostracise those who overfished.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economic Research Southern Africa in its series Working Papers with number 130.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
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Common Pool Resource; Experiment; Ostracism; Fishers;
Other versions of this item:
- Wisdom Akpalu & Peter Martinsson, 2012. "Ostracism and Common Pool Resource Management in a Developing Country: Young Fishers in the Laboratory," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 21(2), pages 266-306, March.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2010-03-13 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-03-13 (Experimental Economics)
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