Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Empirics of Banking Regulation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Fulbert Tchana Tchana

Abstract

This paper empirically assesses whether banking regulation is effective at preventing banking crises. We use a monthly index of banking system fragility, which captures almost every source of risk in the banking system, to estimate the effect of regulatory measures (entry restriction, reserve requirement, deposit insurance, and capital adequacy requirement) on banking stability in the context of a Markov-switching model. Our methodology is less prone to selection and simultaneity bias which are common in this type of study. We apply this method to the Indonesian banking system, which has been subject to several regulatory changes over the last couple of decades, and at the same time, has experienced a severe systemic crisis. We draw the following findings from this research : (i) entry restriction reduces crisis duration as well as the probability of such an occurrence; (ii) larger reserve requirements reduce crisis duration, but increase banking instability; (iii) deposit insurance increases banking system stability and reduces crisis duration; (vi) capital adequacy requirement improves stability and reduces the expected duration of banking crises. Finally, we find that previous studies present a negative simultaneity bias for deposit insurance and a negative selection bias for capital adequacy requirement.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econrsa.org/home/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=149&Itemid=67
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Economic Research Southern Africa in its series Working Papers with number 128.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rza:wpaper:128

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Newlands on Main, F0301 3rd Floor Mariendahl House, cnr Campground and Main Rds, Claremont, 7700 Cape Town
Phone: 021 671-3980
Fax: +27 21 671 3912
Web page: http://www.econrsa.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Banking Crises; Banking System Fragility Index; Banking Regulation; Markov Switching Regression;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica & Gupta, Poonam, 2006. "Inside the crisis: An empirical analysis of banking systems in distress," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 702-718, August.
  2. Blum, Jurg, 1999. "Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 755-771, May.
  3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  4. Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew K & Wyplosz, Charles, 1994. "Speculative Attacks on Pegged Exchange Rates: An Empirical Exploration with Special Reference to the European Monetary System," CEPR Discussion Papers 1060, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew K & Wyplosz, Charles, 1996. "Contagious Currency Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 1453, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Marc Klau & John Hawkins, 2000. "Measuring potential vulnerabilities in emerging market economies," BIS Working Papers 91, Bank for International Settlements.
  7. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 2000. "Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1751, Econometric Society.
  8. Fulbert Tchana Tchana, 2009. "Regulation and Banking Stability: A Survey of Empirical Studies," Working Papers 136, Economic Research Southern Africa.
  9. Kim, Daesik & Santomero, Anthony M, 1988. " Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(5), pages 1219-33, December.
  10. Coe, Patrick J, 2002. "Financial Crisis and the Great Depression: A Regime Switching Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(1), pages 76-93, February.
  11. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 407-438, July.
  12. Alan D. Morrison & Lucy White, 2005. "Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1548-1572, December.
  13. Garcia, Rene, 1998. "Asymptotic Null Distribution of the Likelihood Ratio Test in Markov Switching Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(3), pages 763-88, August.
  14. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
  15. Tai-kuang Ho, 2004. "How Useful are Regime-Switching Models in Banking Crises Identification?," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 764, Econometric Society.
  16. Andrew J. Filardo & Stephen F. Gordon, 1993. "Business cycle durations," Research Working Paper 93-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  17. Kibritcioglu, Aykut, 2002. "Excessive Risk-Taking, Banking Sector Fragility, and Banking Crises," Working Papers 02-0114, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
  18. Lucy White & Alan D. Morrison, 2002. "Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking," OFRC Working Papers Series 2002fe05, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  19. Maddala, G.S., 1986. "Disequilibrium, self-selection, and switching models," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1633-1688 Elsevier.
  20. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:28:y:2002:i:6:p:a0 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2004. "Financial Intermediaries and Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1023-1061, 07.
  22. Scott E. Hein & Jonathan D. Stewart, 2002. "Reserve requirements: A modern perspective," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q4, pages 41-52.
  23. Filardo, Andrew J, 1994. "Business-Cycle Phases and Their Transitional Dynamics," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 12(3), pages 299-308, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Fulbert Tchana Tchana, 2009. "Regulation and Banking Stability: A Survey of Empirical Studies," Working Papers 136, Economic Research Southern Africa.
  2. Isabel Argimón & Jenifer Ruiz, 2010. "The effects of national discretions on banks," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 1029, Banco de Espa�a.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rza:wpaper:128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Yoemna Mosaval).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.