P4P, Reputation and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision
AbstractWe investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the costs of healthcare provision and the magnitude of overprovision which in turn rises patient benefits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen in its series Ruhr Economic Papers with number 0331.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-22 (All new papers)
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