Teaching in the Lab: Financial Incentives in the Education Process
AbstractThis study uses a laboratory experiment to analyze the effectiveness of performance-based monetary incentives in the teaching process. The process of knowledge transmission is recreated using a video-stream. Four different teacher payment schemes are compared, three of which depend on the student‘s success. Furthermore, the experiment is done with two different subject pools: prospective teachers and regular students. Results indicate that prospective teachers do not react to monetary incentives in the given task. However, regular students do react in the expected way: Teachers transmit a significantly higher share of their knowledge when paid according to student performance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen in its series Ruhr Economic Papers with number 0328.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-04-17 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-04-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2012-04-17 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2012-04-17 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- repec:bla:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:2:p:357-380 is not listed on IDEAS
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