Board Accountability and Risk Taking in Banking – Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment
AbstractIn this paper, a law reform is evaluated that aimed at improving the corporate governance of German savings banks by tightening accountability and legal liability of outside directors. The causal effect of this reform on bank risk is identified by difference-in-differences and triple differences strategies. The estimation results show that savings banks subject to the reform increased capital and liquidity ratios. Hence, they have become less vulnerable to unexpected losses and liquidity shocks. This indicates that the low occurrence of outside director litigation reflects incentive effects of current liability regimes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen in its series Ruhr Economic Papers with number 0313.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-03-21 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2012-03-21 (Central Banking)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fahlenbrach, Rudiger & Low, Angie & Stulz, Rene M., 2010.
"The Dark Side of Outside Directors: Do They Quit When They Are Most Needed?,"
Working Paper Series
2010-7, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
- Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & Angie Low & René M. Stulz, 2010. "The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed?," NBER Working Papers 15917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & Angie Low & René M. Stulz, 2010. "The Dark Side of Outside Directors: Do they Quit When They are Most Needed?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 10-17, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Pathan, Shams, 2009. "Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 1340-1350, July.
- Daniel S. Hamermesh & Stephen J. Trejo, 1997.
"The Demand for Hours of Labor: Direct Evidence from California,"
NBER Working Papers
5973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel S. Hamermesh & Stephen J. Trejo, 2000. "The Demand for Hours of Labor: Direct Evidence from California," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 38-47, February.
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