The Political Economy Of Kosher Wars
AbstractIn this paper we develop a theory of Kosher Wars under which Rabbis (certifying authorities) compete to enhance the level of Jewish observation of their congregations. The level of observance can be seen as the Rabbi's rents. Our rent-seeking model explains the establishment of Kashrut standards, first with European style community control under a single Rabbi, and then under America's voluntary structure with the possibility of competing Rabbis.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 200227.
Date of creation: 25 Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: New Jersey Hall - 75 Hamilton Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248
Phone: (732) 932-7482
Fax: (732) 932-7416
Web page: http://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/rutgers-wplist.html
More information through EDIRC
dietary restrictions; Kashrut; kosher; religion; rent-seeking;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jan Myslivecek, 2008. "How to Price Imperfect Certification," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp364, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
- Hein, Eckhard, 2002.
"Monetary policy and wage bargaining in the EMU: Restrictive ECB policies, high unemployment, nominal wage restraint and rising inflation,"
WSI Discussion Papers
103, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
- Eckhard Hein, 2005. "Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining in the EMU: Restrictive ECB Policies, High Unemployment, Nominal Wage Restraint and Rising Inflation," Macroeconomics 0501010, EconWPA.
- Hugh Campbell & Anne Murcott & Angela MacKenzie, 2011. "Kosher in New York City, halal in Aquitaine: challenging the relationship between neoliberalism and food auditing," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 67-79, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.