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The Political Economy Of Kosher Wars

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Author Info

  • Ira N. Gang

    ()
    (Rutgers University)

  • Gil S. Epstein

    ()
    (Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

In this paper we develop a theory of Kosher Wars under which Rabbis (certifying authorities) compete to enhance the level of Jewish observation of their congregations. The level of observance can be seen as the Rabbi's rents. Our rent-seeking model explains the establishment of Kashrut standards, first with European style community control under a single Rabbi, and then under America's voluntary structure with the possibility of competing Rabbis.

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File URL: ftp://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/2002-27.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 200227.

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Date of creation: 25 Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200227

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Related research

Keywords: dietary restrictions; Kashrut; kosher; religion; rent-seeking;

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Cited by:
  1. Jan Myslivecek, 2008. "How to Price Imperfect Certification," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp364, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  2. Hein, Eckhard, 2002. "Monetary policy and wage bargaining in the EMU: Restrictive ECB policies, high unemployment, nominal wage restraint and rising inflation," WSI Discussion Papers 103, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
  3. Hugh Campbell & Anne Murcott & Angela MacKenzie, 2011. "Kosher in New York City, halal in Aquitaine: challenging the relationship between neoliberalism and food auditing," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 67-79, February.

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