Making the French Pay: The Costs and Consequences of the Napoleonic Reparations
AbstractReparations as an instrument of international peace settlements were abandoned after the failure of Germany to pay its post World War I indemnity. However, reparations played a useful role in the construction of earlier peace treaties. This paper examines the payment of reparations by the French after the Napoleonic Wars. By most measures, these reparations were the largest ever fully paid; and they imposed a high cost on the economy in terms of lost output and consumption and diminished capital stock. The incentives to pay were appropriately set and payment permitted France to be accepted once again as an equal among the great powers.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 199924.
Date of creation: 10 Nov 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: New Jersey Hall - 75 Hamilton Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248
Phone: (732) 932-7482
Fax: (732) 932-7416
Web page: http://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/rutgers-wplist.html
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- White, Eugene N., 2001. "Making the French pay: The costs and consequences of the Napoleonic reparations," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(03), pages 337-365, December.
- N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Michael B. Devereux & Gregor W. Smith, 2005.
"Transfer Problem Dynamics: Macroeconomics of the Franco-Prussian War Indemnity,"
1025, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Devereux, Michael B. & Smith, Gregor W., 2007. "Transfer problem dynamics: Macroeconomics of the Franco-Prussian war indemnity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2375-2398, November.
- Michael B. Devereux & Gregor W. Smith, 2004. "Transfer Problem Dynamics: Macroeonomics of the Franco-Prussian War Indemnity," Working Papers 022004, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
- Angelo Riva & Eugene N. White, 2010. "Danger on the Exchange: How Counterparty Risk Was Managed on the Paris Bourse in the Nineteenth Century," NBER Working Papers 15634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.