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Ownership Concentration, Market Monitoring and Performance: Evidence from the UK, the Czech Republic and Poland

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Author Info
Vahe Lskavyan ()
Mariana Spatareanu ()

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Abstract

Using data for publicly traded companies from the UK and two transition countries, the Czech Republic and Poland, we analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and performance while also accounting for the effect of hostile takeover threats on this relationship. Some argue that ownership concentration will improve performance by making the owners more willing or able to monitor managers. Others argue that in the presence of efficient markets, market monitoring (via the threat of hostile takeovers) will discipline the managers. Our results show that concentration is insignificant in explaining performance both in the transition countries, where market monitoring is supposedly weak, and in the UK, where market monitoring is supposedly strong.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark in its series Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark with number 2005-012.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2005
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Handle: RePEc:run:wpaper:2005-012

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Related research
Keywords: Ownership Concentration Markets for Corporate Control

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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  7. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov, 1999. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 227, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Schranz, Mary S, 1993. "Takeovers Improve Firm Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 299-326, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  18. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728, August.
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