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Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU

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Author Info
Francesco Passarelli ()
Jason Barr ()

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Abstract

In this paper we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players' voting 'yes' for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player's power.We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.

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File URL: http://www.rutgers-newark.rutgers.edu/econnwk/workingpapers/2004-012.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark in its series Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark with number 2004-012.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:run:wpaper:2004-012

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Related research
Keywords: power indices agenda setter European Union principal components

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jason Barr & Francesco Passarelli, . "Who Has the Power in the EU?," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2004-005, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2004. "Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francesco Passarelli, 2007. "Asymmetric Bargaining," ISLA Working Papers 26, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
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