Lower bounds rule!
AbstractWe propose two axioms that introduce lower bounds into resource monotonicity require- ments for rules for the problem of adjudicating con?icting claims. Suppose the amount to divide increases. The ?rst axiom requires that two claimants whose lower bound changes equally experience an equal change in awards. The second axiom requires that extra re- sources are divided only among those claimants who experience a strictly positive change in their lower bound. We show that, in the two-claimant case, Concede-and-Divide is the only rule that satis?es both axioms when the axioms are de?ned over a large set of lower bounds that include the minimal rights lower bound and the secured lower bound. We also show that, in the n-claimant case where at least one claimant claims the total amount, the Minimal Overlap rule is the only rule that satis?es both axioms when the axioms are de?ned over the secured lower bound.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium with number 10/683.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Claims problems; Lower bounds; Concede-and-Divide; Minimal Overlap rule.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-MIC-2011-02-19 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Antonio Villar Notario, 2003.
"The Talmud Rule And The Securement Of Agents? Awards,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2003-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Villar, Antonio, 2004. "The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 245-257, March.
- MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., .
"Composition, securement, and concede-and-divide,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1895, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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