Nash rationalizability of collective choice over lotteries
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More about this item
Keywords
independence condition; binary extensions; rationalizability; Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies;
All these keywords.JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DCM-2005-06-19 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-EXP-2005-06-19 (Experimental Economics)
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