Nash rationalizability of collective choice over lotteries

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Nash rationalizability of collective choice over lotteries

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T. DEMUYNCK ()
L. LAUWERS

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Abstract

To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game (allowing mixed strategies) maximize expected utilities and select a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to study the reaction of the revealed collective choice upon changes in the space of strategies available to the players. The joint hypothesis is supported if the revealed choices satisfy an extended version of Richter’s congruence axiom together with a contraction-expansion axiom that models the noncooperative behavior. In addition, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for a binary relation to have an independent ordering extension, and for individual choices over lotteries to be rationalizable.

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Paper provided by Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium with number 05/301.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/301

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-06-19 (All new papers)
NEP-DCM-2005-06-19 (Discrete Choice Models)
NEP-EXP-2005-06-19 (Experimental Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Conlisk, John, 1989. "Three Variants on the Allais Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 392-407, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ray, Indrajit & Zhou, Lin, 2001. "Game Theory via Revealed Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 415-424, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Indrajit Ray & Lin Zhou, . "Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences," Discussion Papers 00/15, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
Sen, Amartya K, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(115), pages 307-17, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

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