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Financial Constraints and Unemployment Equilibrium

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Author Info
CESARONI GIOVANNI
MESSORI MARCELLO

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Abstract

This paper aims to show (1) that the IS/LM model will be a coherent solution to Keynes's analysis of unemployment, if the relaxation of the general equilibrium framework is based solely on exogenous price and quantity constraints; (2) that the consequent determination of unemployment equilibria is analytically fragile and does not support Keynes' attempt to reduce the standard approach to a particular case of his "general theory"; and (3) that a more robust determination of unemployment equilibria has to be based on the integration of credit rationing into a general equilibrium model. To illustrate points (1) and (2), we review some of the traditional macroeconomic models of the neoclassical synthesis, and we show that the problems bequeathed by these models are only partially solved by the strand of the new Keynesian economics based on market imperfections and endogenous rigidities. To illustrate point (3) we build a simple general equilibrium model in which prices are - in principle - perfectly flexible and credit rationing implies unemployment equilibria. Apart from the crucial role played by the credit market, our model is very similar to that developed by the neoclassical synthesis.

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Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 191.

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Date of creation: May 2003
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Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceiswp:191

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  1. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1987. "Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 647-66, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-89, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bester, Helmut, 1987. "The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 887-899, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Webb, David C, 2000. "The Impact of Liquidity Constraints on Bank Lending Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 69-91, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-76, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. de Meza, David & Webb, David, 1999. "Wealth, Enterprise and Credit Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 153-63, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gertler, Mark & Gilchrist, Simon, 1993. " The Role of Credit Market Imperfections in the Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Arguments and Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 95(1), pages 43-64.
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  11. Dan Bernhardt, 2000. "Credit Rationing?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 235-239, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. David de Meza, 2002. "Overlending?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages F17-F31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1992. "Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets and Its Implications for Macro-economics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 694-724, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Hart, Oliver, 1982. "A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 109-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Evans, David S & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1989. "An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 808-27, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Dr. Peter Kenning & Hilke Plassmann, 2004. "NeuroEconomics," Experimental 0412005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  20. Laurence Ball & David Romer, 1990. "Real Rigidities and the Non-Neutrality of Money," NBER Working Papers 2476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. de Meza, David & Webb, David, 2000. "Does credit rationing imply insufficient lending?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 215-234, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Greenwald, Bruce & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1993. "New and Old Keynesians," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 23-44, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Innes, Robert, 1991. "Investment and government intervention in credit markets when there is asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 347-381, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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