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Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 172.

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Date of creation: Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceiswp:172

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1. Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997. "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1604, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Suarez,J. & Sussman,O., 1995. "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," Papers 9518, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
   • Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997. "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 47-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Townsend, Robert M., 1988. "Information constrained insurance : The revelation principle extended," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 411-450. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Choe, Chongwoo, 1998. "Contract design and costly verification games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 327-340, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Choe, C., 1995. "Contract Desing and Costly Verification Games," Papers 95.18, La Trobe - Department of Economics.
6. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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   • Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Compatibility with Ex Post Information Asymmetry," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-38, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
8. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1998. "Collateralized debt as the optimal contract," Working Paper 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Webb, David C, 1992. "Two-Period Financial Contracts with Private Information and Costly State Verification," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 1113-23, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-48, April.
    Other versions:
    • Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, 1995. "Credit Cycles," NBER Working Papers 5083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • John Moore & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, . "Credit Cycles," Discussion Papers 1995-5, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    • Ryo Kato, 2003. "Matlab code for Kiyotaki-Moore credit cycles," QM&RBC Codes 113, Quantitative Macroeconomics & Real Business Cycles. [Downloadable!]
11. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
12. Azariadis, Costas & Smith, Bruce, 1998. "Financial Intermediation and Regime Switching in Business Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 516-36, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Innes, Robert, 1993. "Financial Contracting under Risk Neutrality, Limited Liability and Ex ante Asymmetric Information," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 60(237), pages 27-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Chang, Chun, 1990. "The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 68-86, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. C. Choe, 1998. "A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 237-255. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Gaia Garino & Peter Simmons, . "A Note on Costly State Observation Contracts with Risk Aversion," Discussion Papers 95/24, Department of Economics, University of York.
21. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Papers 583, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
22. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.

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