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Leviathan and Competition among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit Taxation

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Author Info
Michael Rauscher () (University of Rostock)

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Abstract

The paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and, thus, helps to tame Leviathan governments. However, this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government. In the case of benefit taxes, e.g. user charges, a Leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum-sum taxes.

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File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-rostock.de/fileadmin/Institute/VWL/VWL-Institut/RePEc/pdf/wp013thuenen.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 1997
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany in its series Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory with number 13.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ros:wpaper:13

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, 1994. "Public-Sector Capital and the Productivity Puzzle," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(1), pages 12-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Rauscher, Michael, 1997. "Interjurisdictional Competition and the Efficiency of the Public Sector: The Triumph of the Market over the State?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1624, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gramlich, Edward M, 1994. "Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 1176-96, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Epple, Dennis & Zelenitz, Allan, 1981. "The Implications of Competition among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(6), pages 1197-1217, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Moene, Karl O., 1986. "Types of bureaucratic interaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 333-345, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The selection principle and market failure in systems competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 247-274, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Schindler, Dirk & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2007. "Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavior," Discussion Papers 2007/8, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. George Zodrow, 2003. "Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(6), pages 651-671, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2006. "Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Janeba, Eckhard & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2008. "The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions," Discussion Papers 2008/22, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Toshihiro Ihori & C. C. Yang, 2008. "Interregional Tax Competition and Intraregional Political Competition: The Optimal Provision of Public Goods," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-553, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  6. Caroline M. Hoxby, 1999. "The Productivity of Schools and Other Local Public Goods Providers," NBER Working Papers 6911, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alexandre A. Porsse & Eduardo A. Haddad & Eduardo P. Ribeiro, 2006. "Modeling Interjurisdictional Tax Competition In A Federal System," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 54, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Hannes Winner, 2005. "Has Tax Competition Emerged in OECD Countries? Evidence from Panel Data," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(5), pages 667-687, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2002. "Why Europe Should Love Tax Competition - and the U.S. Even More So," NBER Working Papers 9334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Parry, Ian, 2001. "How Large are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition?," Discussion Papers dp-01-28, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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