Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Christopher P. Chambers
• Dan Bernhardt

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP22.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: pages
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp22

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, Wallis Institute, HARKNESS 109B ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Terry Fisher).

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

• Article
  • Dan Bernhardt & Christopher P. Chambers, 2006. "Profit Sharing (with Workers) Facilitates Collusion (Among Firms)," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 483-502, Autumn.

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-15.