Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Robustness of Exclusion in Multi-dimensional Screening

Contents:

Author Info

  • Paulo Barelli

    (University of Rochester)

  • Suren Basov

    (La Trobe University)

  • Mauricio Bugarin

    (Insper Institute)

  • Ian King

    (University of Melbourne)

Abstract

We extend Armstrong's result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result is generic and applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and consumer types. Second, we extend the result beyond the monopolistic market structure to generalized oligopoly settings with entry. We also analyze applications to several quite different settings: credit markets, the automobile industry, research grants, the regulation of a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions, and involuntary unemployment in the labor market.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_571.pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: None

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 571.

as in new window
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:571

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. S. Basov & P. Bardsley, 2004. "A Model of Grants Distribution: A Screening Approach," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 252, Econometric Society.
  2. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2001. "Competitive Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 579-605, Winter.
  3. Basov Suren & Yin Xiangkang, 2010. "Optimal Screening by Risk-Averse Principals," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-25, March.
  4. Bertrand VILLENEUVE, 2003. "Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 69, pages 119-142.
  5. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
  6. Rochet, J. C., 1985. "The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 113-128, April.
  7. Jullien, Bruno, 1997. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," IDEI Working Papers 67, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  8. Armstrong, M., 1996. "Price discrimination by a many-product firm," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9628, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  9. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  10. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
  11. Michael Smart, 1996. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," Working Papers msmart-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  12. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Stole, Lars A, 2002. "Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 277-311, January.
  13. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
  14. Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Frank Page & Benar fux Svaiter, 2001. "The one object optimal auction and the desirability of exclusion," GE, Growth, Math methods 0112002, EconWPA.
  15. Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Armstrong, Mark, 1999. "Optimal Regulation with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 196-215, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page, Frank H. & Svaiter, Benar fux, 2013. "Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 106-110.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:571. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriel Mihalache).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.