Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games: John Nash and beyond

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

This essay surveys the literature on the axiomatic model of bargaining formulated by Nash ("The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 28, 1950, 155-162).

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_554.pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: None

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 554.

as in new window
Length: 60 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:554

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: Nash's bargaining model; Nash solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; Egalitarian solution;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Craig Webb, 2013. "Bargaining with subjective mixtures," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 15-39, January.
  2. Maria Gallego & David Scoones, 2011. "Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 591-610, April.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:554. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriel Mihalache).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.