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Subjective Probabilities on Subjectivity Unambiguous Event

Author

Listed:
  • Epstein, L.G.
  • Zhang, J.

Abstract

Evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox shows that decision-makers do not assign probabilities to all events. It is intuitive that they may differ not only in the probabilities assigned to given events but also in the identity of the events to which they assign probabilities. This paper describes a theory of probability that is fully subjective in the sense that both the domain and the values of the probability measure are derived from preference. The key is a formal definition for subjectively unambiguous event'.

Suggested Citation

  • Epstein, L.G. & Zhang, J., 1998. "Subjective Probabilities on Subjectivity Unambiguous Event," RCER Working Papers 456, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    • Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:456
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    DECISION MAKING ; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS ; PROBABILITY;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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