Das Governance-Dilemma der demokratischen Wirtschaftspolitik
AbstractAs a result of the prevailing governance structure, economic policy in democracies usually suffers from specific deficiencies. Among these are the predominance of distributive over efficiency objectives, the neglect of long-run effects, and the lack of or biased use of expert knowledge in the political decision making process. These deficiencies can be attributed to a 'monopoly of democratic legitimacy' of the politicians and parties, an overloaded democratic delegation, the influence of interest groups, and the short-run incentives in the political process. The focus of this paper is on the reform of the governance structure of economic policy. It is suggested that a 'dual democratic legitimacy' should be introduced. A 'senate' which is independent of the political parties will be directly elected by the people. The senate firstly works as a second chamber in bicameralistic legislation, closely cooperating with consultative expert institutions. Secondly, the senate acts as a principal for any public institution outside of the parliament and the government, appointing the top personnel.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg in its series Working Paper with number 94/2009.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 10 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Delegation; Politische Institutionen; Zwei-Kammer-Systeme; Senat;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-08-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GER-2009-08-22 (German Papers)
- NEP-PBE-2009-08-22 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-08-22 (Positive Political Economics)
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