We examine how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones, ecause borrowers may exogenously switch locations. Lenders are, however, engaged in spatial competition, and thus may lose market power by sharing information with competitors. Our results suggest that asymmetric information in the credit market increases the frequency of information sharing between lenders significantly. Competition between lenders reduces information sharing, but the impact of competition seems to be only of second order importance.
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Paper provided by Swiss National Bank in its series Working Papers with number
2008-1.
Length: 53 pages Date of creation: 30 Apr 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ris:snbwpa:2008_001
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