Coping with Conflict:A Dynamic Decision Making Perspective
AbstractThis research investigates how students of political science playing the role of a state leader cope with structural and dynamic complexities of international conflict. This was studied with the aid of an interactive microworld simulator of a fishing dispute, which was designed according to principles of system dynamics. The research question was what type of decision-making patterns characterized subjects who adapted successfully to the challenges posed by the opponent in comparison to subjects who pursued policies that produced suboptimal payoffs. The results of this research suggest two reasons for poor adaptation. First, rather than exploring the consequences of all possible policy options, most subjects had very strong pre-existing policy preferences and were reluctant to abandon them in favor of alternative policies. Second, many subjects did not adequately analyze the statistical data that were required in order to estimate the payoffs. A third possibility that was explored but not sufficiently supported is that decisions were based on satisficing rather than comparing utilities associated with alternative policies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Network of European Peace Scientists in its series NEPS Working Papers with number 3/2011.
Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
policy preferences; decision making; international conflicts;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-02-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CSE-2012-02-08 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-EXP-2012-02-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-02-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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