Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Incomplete Information in Cournot Oligopoly: The Case of Unknown Production Capacities

Contents:

Author Info

  • Richter, Jan

    ()
    (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln)

Abstract

A Cournot oligopoly in which firms face incomplete information with respect to production capacities is studied. For the case where the firms’ capacities are stochastically independent, the functional form of equilibrium strategies is derived. If inverse demand is concave, a unique symmetric equilibrium exists, and if demand is linear, then every equilibrium is symmetric. In the case of duopoly, the impact on social welfare when firms commit ex-ante on exchanging information is analyzed. Sharing information increases expected output and social welfare in a large class of models. If the demand intercept is sufficiently large, sharing information increases producer surplus and decreases consumer surplus (and vice versa).

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ewi.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Publikationen/Working_Paper/EWI_WP_13-01_cournot_model.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln in its series EWI Working Papers with number 2013-1.

as in new window
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:ewikln:2013_001

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Vogelsanger Str. 321, Alte Wagenfabrik, 50827 Köln
Phone: ++ 49 (0) 221 277 29 100
Fax: ++ 49 (0) 221 277 29 400
Web page: http://www.ewi.uni-koeln.de/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Oligopoly; Incomplete Information; Cournot; Capacity Constraints; Information Sharing;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
  2. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
  3. John C Harsanyi, 1997. "Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1175, David K. Levine.
  4. Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2008. "On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 2008-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2002. "Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 151-160, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Richter, Jan & Viehmann, Johannes, 2014. "The value of information in explicit cross-border capacity auction regimes in electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 74-84.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:ewikln:2013_001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Monika Schmid).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.