Matching Funds in Public Campaign Finance
AbstractMatching provisions in state clean elections acts have been ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds (Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 2011). By modeling political speech as a costly advertising activity in an electoral contest, we show that matching funds can indeed decrease speech by privately funded candidates. Moreover, the state can undo any restrictions on matching programs imposed by courts, and replicate the equilibria under a matching program, by adopting an appropriately chosen lumpsum funding scheme. We also evaluate the validity of two specific arguments made by the Supreme Court in its Arizona decision, finding that one is incorrect and one is correct within the context of our model. Lastly, we provide preliminary evidence that the Arizona ruling has in fact increased private spending and increased the number of candidates per election race.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012-20.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2012
Date of revision:
public campaign finance; matching funds; trigger funds; clean elections;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
- K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-09 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Prat, Andrea & Puglisi, Riccardo & Snyder, James M., 2010.
"Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits,"
International Quarterly Journal of Political Science,
now publishers, vol. 5(3), pages 291-318, December.
- Andrea Prat & Riccardo Puglisi & James Snyder, 2005. "Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000960, David K. Levine.
- Riccardo Puglisi & Andrea Prat & James Snyder, 2006. "Is private campaign finance a good thing? estimates of the potential informational benefits," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/10393, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Tilman Klumpp, 2011. "Populism, Partisanship, and the Funding of Political Campaigns," Emory Economics 1107, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
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