Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football
AbstractDefection in every period is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games with complete information. However, in the presence of incomplete information, players may have an incentive to cooperate in some periods, leading to tit-for-tat strategies. We describe the decision to comply with recruiting regulations or cheat made by NCAA Division IA football programs as a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. The game includes incomplete information about the resources devoted to football programs, the recruiting effort made by rival programs, and the behavior of rival programs. We test for evidence that NCAA Division IA football programs follow tit-for-tat strategies in terms of complying with or defecting from NCAA recruiting rules using panel data from NCAA Division IA football over the period 1976-2005. We find anecdotal and empirical evidence that is consistent with tit-for-tat strategies in this setting. The presence of in-conference rivals under NCAA sanctions increases the probability of a team being placed under sanctions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-24.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
noncooperative behavior; cartels; NCAA football; tit-for-tat strategies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-07-28 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2009-07-28 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SPO-2009-07-28 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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