Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football

Contents:

Author Info

  • Humphreys, Brad

    ()
    (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)

  • Ruseski, Jane

    ()
    (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)

Abstract

Defection in every period is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games with complete information. However, in the presence of incomplete information, players may have an incentive to cooperate in some periods, leading to tit-for-tat strategies. We describe the decision to comply with recruiting regulations or cheat made by NCAA Division IA football programs as a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. The game includes incomplete information about the resources devoted to football programs, the recruiting effort made by rival programs, and the behavior of rival programs. We test for evidence that NCAA Division IA football programs follow tit-for-tat strategies in terms of complying with or defecting from NCAA recruiting rules using panel data from NCAA Division IA football over the period 1976-2005. We find anecdotal and empirical evidence that is consistent with tit-for-tat strategies in this setting. The presence of in-conference rivals under NCAA sanctions increases the probability of a team being placed under sanctions.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics.ualberta.ca/~/media/economics/FacultyAndStaff/WPs/WP2009-24-Ruseski.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-24.

as in new window
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:albaec:2009_024

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 8-14 HM Tory, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2H4
Phone: (780) 492-3406
Fax: (780) 492-3300
Web page: http://www.economics.ualberta.ca/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: noncooperative behavior; cartels; NCAA football; tit-for-tat strategies;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414 Elsevier.
  2. Fleisher, Arthur III & Shughart, William II & Tollison, Robert D. & Goff, Brian L., 1988. "Crime or punishment? : Enforcement of the NCAA football cartel," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 433-451, December.
  3. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  4. Craig A. Depken II & Dennis P. Wilson, 2006. "NCAA Enforcement and Competitive Balance in College Football," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 826–845, April.
  5. Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, 2009. "Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence from NCAA Football," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 720–735, January.
  6. Michael Spence, 1978. "Tacit Co-ordination and Imperfect Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 11(3), pages 490-505, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. In Lee, 1999. "Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 115-134, September.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:albaec:2009_024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Brenda Carrier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.