The Optimal Taxation Approach to Intergovernmental Grants
AbstractAn optimal tax system equates the marginal cost of public funds across all tax bases. This idea is applied to a federation to derive the optimal unconditional transfers that will promote an optimal allocation of taxation and expenditures among the governments in the federation. This approach provides insights into the concepts of vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance, fiscal capacity, and fiscal need. Expressions for the optimal fiscal equalization grant and the optimal vertical fiscal gap are derived. We also show how the marginal cost of public funds affects the optimal matching grant rate for activities that generate expenditure externalities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-16.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 10 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
intergovernmental grants; median voter model; fiscal federalism; vertical fiscal gap; vertical fiscal imbalance; fiscal capacity; fiscal need;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2009-04-05 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2009-04-05 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2009-04-05 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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