Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-Natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil
AbstractWhether campaign advertising influences election outcomes is an open question; a paradox given the amount spent on campaigning in general and TV advertising in particular. We argue that such “absence of documentation” is due to the focus of the empirical literature on the United States, in which the allocation of campaign spending and advertising is decentralized. We explore a quasinatural experiment that enables us to mitigate the omitted variables and reverse causality problems caused by decentralized allocation. In Brazil, gubernatorial elections work in a two-round system. In the first round, candidates’ TV time shares are determined by their coalitions’ share of seats in the National Parliament. In the second round, TV time is split equally between the first-round winner and runner-up. Using differences between rounds as a source of variation, we find a large causal effect of TV advertising on election outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil) in its series Textos para discussão with number 550.
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision: May 2010
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TV Advertising; Campaign Spending; Election Outcomes; Endogeneity; Quasi-Natural Experiments;
Other versions of this item:
- Bernardo S. Da Silveira & Jo�o M. P. De Mello, 2011. "Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 590-612.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-09-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MAC-2007-09-30 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2007-09-30 (Marketing)
- NEP-POL-2007-09-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Laura Bianchini & Federico Revelli, 2013.
"Green Polities: Urban Environmental Performance and Government Popularity,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 72-90, 03.
- Bianchini Laura & Revelli Federico, 2011. "Green Polities: Urban Environmental Performance and Government Popularity," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201104, University of Turin.
- Laura Bianchini & Federico Revelli, 2011. "Green polities: urban environmental performance and government popularity," Working Papers 2011/18, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
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