Dynamic Advertising with Spillovers: Cartel vs Competitive Fringe
AbstractA differential oligopoly game with advertising is investigated, where different dynamics occur between two groups of agents, the former playing a competitive Nash game and the latter cooperating as a cartel. Sufficient conditions for stability and a qualitative analysis of the profit ratio and social welfare at equilibrium are provided. A threshold value for the size of the competitive fringe is pointed out by a suitable numerical simulation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 48-07.
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision: Jul 2007
Advertising; Differential games; Oligopoly; Collusion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-11-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2007-11-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2007-11-10 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-11-10 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2007-11-10 (Marketing)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2001. "Advertising in a Differential Oligopoly Game," Working Papers 427, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini & G. Leitmann, 2005. "Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 535, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2002. "Advertising with Spillover Effects in a Differential Oligopoly Game With Differentiated Goods," Working Papers 430, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Gustav Feichtinger & Richard F. Hartl & Suresh P. Sethi, 1994. "Dynamic Optimal Control Models in Advertising: Recent Developments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(2), pages 195-226, February.
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