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The Implications of Information Lags for the Stabilization Bias and Optimal Delegation

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Author Info
Jean-Paul Lam () (University of Waterloo, Canada and The Rimini Centre for Economics Analysis, Italy.)
Florian Pelgrin () (University of Lausanne, Switzerland)
Abstract

Many papers for example Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) have shown that in a New Keynesian model with a significant degree of forward-looking behaviour, policy regimes that target either the change in the output-gap (speed limit targeting) or nominal income growth can considerably reduce the size of the stabilization biasÐthe inefficiency that arises when a central bank conducts policy under discretion as opposed to commitment. Inflation targeting can also reduce the size of the stabilization bias but unless inflation expectations in the model are predominantly backward-looking, this targeting regime does not perform as well as speed limit or nominal income growth targeting. Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) obtain their results using a New Keynesian model where changes in the policy rate affect macroeconomic variables immediately. In this paper, we compare the performance of several targeting regimes by using a New Keynesian model that includes a delayed response of monetary policy as a result of information lags. We find two results that are substantially different from Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003). First the size of the stabilization bias is considerably reduced. Second, a regime that targets inflation outperforms a regime that targets either the change in the output-gap or the growth in nominal income even when inflation expectations are very forward-looking.

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Paper provided by Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 39-07.

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Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision: Jul 2007
Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:39-07

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Related research
Keywords: Stabilization bias Inflation Targeting Discretion Commitment Information Lag

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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This page was last updated on 2008-9-26.


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