This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Last Resort Gambles, Risky Debt and Liquidation Policy

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Elettra Agliardi () (University of Bologna and The Rimini Centre for Economics Analysis, Italy.)
Rainer Andergassen () (University of Bologna)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper develops a real option model in which the interaction between debt, liquidation policy and risky investments is studied. We consider a manager who owns the firm and faces the opportunity to invest in risky pro jects which may bo ost current profits at the cost of bankruptcy if they turn out to be unsuccessful. These investments are "last resort gambles" in the sense that, if successful, they save the company from insolvency, while, if unsuccessful, they make liquidation unavoidable. We show that last resort gamble strategies delay liquidation. We study how the liquidation and the last resort gamble strategies are affected by the firmÕs capital structure.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp31_07.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 31-07.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision: Jul 2007
Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:31-07

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rcfea.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Francesco Billi).

Related research
Keywords: Last resort gambles; risky investments; liquidation policy; real options.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Oliver Hart, 2000. "Different Approaches to Bankruptcy," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1903, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Hayne E. Leland., 1998. "Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-278, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Goldman, Eitan & Slezak, Steve L., 2006. "An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 603-626, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Burns, Natasha & Kedia, Simi, 2006. "The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 35-67, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, 1993. "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1993-2), pages 1-74. [Downloadable!]
  6. Decamps, Jean-Paul & Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 2002. "Excessive continuation and dynamic agency costs of debt," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1623-1644, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," NBER Working Papers 9813, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bergstresser, Daniel & Philippon, Thomas, 2006. "CEO incentives and earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 511-529, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1106, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 655-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Michael C. Jensen, 2004. "The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance," European Financial Management, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, vol. 10(4), pages 549-565. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.