This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

German Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
John T. Addison () (QueenÕs University and The Rimini The Rimini Center for Economic Analysis, Italy)
Paulino Teixeira () (Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal)
Thomas Zwick () (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Germany)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the effect of German works councils on wages, using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB for 2001. In general, we find that works councils are associated with higher earnings, even after accounting for worker and establishment heterogeneity. At this level, the works council premium exceeds the collective bargaining mark-up, and is modestly higher in the presence of collective bargaining once we account for worker selection into the two institutions. More specifically, works councils do seem to benefit women relatively and to build on collective bargaining in this regard. They also seem to favor foreign, east-German, and service-sector workers although the effects of collective bargaining are not always reinforcing. The evidence from quantile regressions suggests that only in conjunction with collective bargaining is the narrowing influence of works councils really clear-cut. The above findings pertain to workers in all plants. Once we consider smaller establishments with 21-100 employees, however, each of these results is further qualified, beginning with the effect on wage levels where premia are now only observed in conjunction with collective bargaining.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp11_08.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 11-08.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision: Jan 2008
Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:11-08

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rcfea.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Francesco Billi).

Related research
Keywords: works councils; collective bargaining coverage; matched employer-employee data; wages; wage distribution.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-080/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? To receive notification of recent additions to the database, subscribe to the free NEP reports.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-4.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.