The Global Effects of Subglobal Climate Policies
AbstractIndividual countries are in the process of legislating responses to the challenges posed by climate change. The prospect of rising carbon prices raises concerns in these nations about the effects on the competitiveness of their own energy-intensive industries and the potential for carbon leakage, particularly leakage to emerging economies that lack comparable regulation. In response, certain developed countries are proposing controversial trade-related measures and allowance allocation designs to complement their climate policies. Missing from much of the debate on trade-related measures is a broader understanding of how climate policies implemented unilaterally (or subglobally) affect all countries in the global trading system. Arguably, the largest impacts are from the targeted carbon pricing itself, which generates macroeconomic effects, terms-of-trade changes, and shifts in global energy demand and prices; it also changes the relative prices of certain energy-intensive goods. This paper studies how climate policies implemented in certain major economies (the European Union and the United States) affect the global distribution of economic and environmental outcomes, and how these outcomes may be altered by complementary policies aimed at addressing carbon leakage.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-10-48.
Date of creation: 18 Oct 2010
Date of revision:
cap-and-trade; emissions leakage; border carbon adjustments; output-based allocation; general equilibrium model;
Other versions of this item:
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- Q43 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy and the Macroeconomy
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-10-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-10-30 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-10-30 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bohringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2005.
"On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2041-2055, November.
- Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2003. "On the Design of Optimal Grandfathering Schemes for Emission Allowances," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-08, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Christoph Böhringer & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2010. "The Costs of Compliance: A CGE Assessment of Canada's Policy Options under the Kyoto Protocol," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 177-211, 02.
- Fischer, Carolyn & Fox, Alan K., 2009. "Combining Rebates with Carbon Taxes: Optimal Strategies for Coping with Emissions Leakage and Tax Interactions," Discussion Papers dp-09-12, Resources For the Future.
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